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Abstract
The World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) draft Decision-Making Process and Tool to assist governments in 
preventing and managing conflicts of interest in nutrition policy marks a step-change in WHO thinking on large 
corporations and nutrition policy. If followed closely it stands to revolutionise business-government relations 
in nutrition policy. Ralston and colleagues outline how the food and beverage industry have argued against the 
decision-making tool. This commentary expands on their study by setting industry framing within a broader 
analysis of corporate power and explores the challenges in managing industry influence in nutrition policy. The 
commentary examines how the food and beverage industry’s collaboration and partnership agenda seeks to shape 
how policy problems and solutions are interpreted and acted on and explores how this agenda and their efforts to 
define conflicts of interest effectively represent non-policy programmes. More generally, we point to the difficulties 
that member states will face in adopting the tool and highlight the importance of considering the central role of 
transnational food and beverage companies in contemporary economies to managing their influence in nutrition 
policy.
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The World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) draft Decision-Making Process and Tool1 to assist governments in preventing and managing conflicts of 
interest in nutrition policy1,2 marks a step-change in WHO 
thinking on large corporations and nutrition policy as well 
as an implied acknowledgement that the commodification of 
food systems by large transnational corporations is driving 
the global epidemic of diet-related diseases.3-9 The decision-
making tool encompasses a six-step process of risk assessment, 
balancing and mitigation.1,10,11 It applies generally to non-state 
actors and is presented as a resource that ‘governments may 
decide, at their discretion, to follow…completely or partially.’1 
However, if followed closely it stands to revolutionise business-
government relations in nutrition policy in much the same 
way as Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (FCTC), which aims to protect tobacco 
policies from tobacco industry political influence.10,12
The potential policy implications of the decision-making 
tool are illustrated by ‘exclusionary criteria’ – outlined in Step 
Two – to determine whether governments should engage 
with a non-state actor. These include whether the actor aims 
to participate in ‘policy development’ – which is broadly 
defined to encompass agenda setting, policy formulation and 
decision-making - or ‘contribute (in-kind or financially) to 
activities related to government normative work or public 
officials.’1 In addition, Step Two provides a ‘risk-based matrix’ 
which effectively recommends that governments should 
not engage in ‘high risk’ engagement with corporations 
that produce just one product for which national dietary 
guidelines recommend a reduction. Examples of high-risk 
engagement outlined in an appendix to the tool are extensive 
and include: those taking place during policy development, 
monitoring and evaluation; health promotion campaigns; 
those occurring under conditions of ‘low visibility’; and 
financial contributions where ‘the external actor advertises 
its contribution in its promotional material to promote its 
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image.’1 The message is clear. Direct and indirect efforts by 
food and beverage corporations to influence government 
policy aimed at improving population diets should now be 
considered major obstacles to reducing diet-related diseases.
Corporate Social Responsibility and Discursive Power in 
Nutrition Policy
Ralston and colleagues’ scholarly study of the 2017 WHO 
consultation on the decision-making tool provides a 
fascinating account of business thinking on nutrition policy.10 
The take home message of the paper – that all commercial 
actors were highly critical of the tool – is instructive, if 
unsurprising. More importantly, their analysis of the policy 
frames used by commercial actors provides an important guide 
to the discursive architecture that underpins contemporary 
corporate political activity within nutrition policy.
Ralston and colleagues note that commercial actors 
articulated a ‘collaboration and partnership’ frame which 
was strongly critical of the tool as exclusionary, viewed its 
recommendations as inconsistent with principles of good 
governance, and presented conflicts of interest as compatible 
with extensive engagement and adequately addressed by 
existing practices.10 The key to understanding this frame 
and, more generally, commercial actors’ submissions to 
consultations is that they typically draw on a broader, 
logically coherent, integrated system of concepts, ideas, and 
beliefs. Collectively, these constitute a discursive framework 
advocating a programme and style of governance consistent 
with strong corporate earnings13-15 and represent an important 
building block of corporations’ ‘discursive power’ in so far 
as they seek to shape how policy problems and solutions 
are interpreted and acted on.16,17 The framework is carefully 
developed within corporations’ government and regulatory 
affairs departments and forms the discursive spine of 
corporate social responsibility programmes.14 In most cases, 
it represents a heavily socialised rationalisation of corporate 
interests, which presents a vision of private interests working 
to produce ‘public goods’ and is normative, ethical and moral 
in tone and content.
More importantly for understanding the significance of 
Ralston and colleagues’ work, the ideas and concepts that 
make up the framework often exhibit one or more of the 
following characteristics. Elasticity of Meaning First, they are 
often flexible and elastic, having been purposefully developed 
to be understood differently by actors with different interests 
– government officials, civil society actors, the general public, 
shareholders, and corporate partners.14,18,19 The Defensive-
Offensive Pirouette Second, they aim to translate what are 
essentially self-serving, defensive political positions into 
constructive, forward-looking proposals, which although 
resonating with widely accepted social and political values14 
seek to limit government intervention in markets. Issue 
Definition and Appropriation Third, they seek to appropriate 
and, ultimately, redefine progressive ideas, concepts, and 
policy proposals which aim to facilitate ‘public goods’ so that 
they are more closely aligned with corporate interests.20,21 
Non-action through claims of complexity (of the policy 
problem) and overreach (of the policy solution) Fourth, they 
commonly point to the inherent complexity of the policy 
problem under consideration, which sets up policy proposals 
as either oversimplified or overreaching and provides a basis 
for advocating inaction or limited action.13,22
Collaboration, Partnership, and (Non)Decision-Making
In general terms, commercial actors’ strong support for 
‘collaboration and partnership’ illustrates the first two of these 
characteristics. As Hawkes and Buse have noted, partnership, 
as used in nutrition policy and practice, comprises a ‘mélange 
of interactions involving a range of different activities, from 
education campaigns to joint research activities, and a range 
of processes and structures for interaction.’23 This speaks to 
the elastic quality of the concept, but also its broader political 
significance in translating what is effectively a defensive 
position into a constructive proposition. In addition to 
describing a diverse set of practices, partnership represents 
a means of symbolically positioning corporate actors 
with respect to policy-making. In this sense, and without 
always being explicit, partnership constitutes a rejection 
of government-led, evidence-based, population level 
approaches to managing the market environment for food 
and beverages in favour of non-evidenced based strategies in 
which government responsibility for population nutrition is 
displaced onto epidemiologically compromised corporations. 
Put simply, partnership ultimately implies and constitutes a 
nonpolicy programme, conveyed through the language of 
constructive engagement. 
The defensive-offensive pirouette is captured perfectly 
in Food Industry Asia’s (FIA) submission. As Ralston and 
colleagues’ note, the FIA called on the WHO to rethink the 
tool to ensure that the private sector was not ‘shut out…
from any meaningful policy discussion,’ reflecting a broader 
concern that it was ‘formulated in a way that contradicts and 
would discourage a very wide range of engagement with non-
State Actors.’24 Their proposed alternative - ‘multi-stakeholder 
partnerships’ and ‘working collaboratively with government, 
policy-makers, academics and civil society’ – was presented 
as a ‘cost-effective mechanism for delivering positive socio-
economic outcomes.’24 By way of an example, FIA pointed 
to self-regulatory measures aimed at promoting responsible 
marketing to children within a ‘framework in which robust 
industry-led standards can be easily incorporated in regional 
and national regulatory policies.’24 In the context of nutrition 
policy, there is strong evidence to suggest that such measures 
are severely limited25-29 and there is compelling evidence 
across policy domains, including nutrition, to suggest 
that they are designed to scotch the introduction of public 
regulation by effectively filling regulatory space.30-32 Despite 
these well-documented weaknesses, by appealing to the idea 
that stakeholders with opposing interests can work towards 
a common goal, multi-stakeholder partnerships are not only 
presented as efficient, but also above the factious trade-offs 
of traditional politics. Doing so establishes ‘collaboration 
and partnership’ as the sensible default position against 
which dissenting opinions are unfavourably compared and 
caricatured. 
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Conflicts of Interest, Issue Definition, and Non-action 
Through Claims of Complexity and Overreach
The WHO’s efforts to outline recommendations to manage 
corporate influence in nutrition policy and practice in the draft 
tool involve adapting the concept of ‘institutional conflicts 
of interest,’ which, in effect, covers circumstances where 
corporate actors’ interests are not aligned with governments’ 
public health priorities.2,33 Ralston and colleagues’ analysis 
of commercial actors’ response to this innovation illustrate a 
confused mix of issue definition and claims to complexity and 
overreach. 
Commercial actors sought to define conflicts of interest 
in three respects. First, by narrowing the concept to include 
individually-based conflicts of interests only. Second, by 
stretching the concept to include a range of individual 
‘sources of bias.’ Described as ‘extensive and complex’ 
by the International Dairy Federation, these included 
‘cognitive,’ ‘publication,’ ‘political,’ ‘ethical,’ ‘statistical,’ ‘ethical,’ 
‘philosophical,’ ‘statements in publications,’ a ‘history of unpaid 
advisory roles,’ and ‘organisational affiliations.’34-36 Third, by 
drawing equivalence of effect between these additional sources 
of bias and conventional financial conflicts of interests.35
Conflating the potential effects of interests and potential 
sources of bias with conflicts of interests makes conflicts 
of interest appear so pervasive that they cannot be avoided 
but only disclosed37 and is consistent with commercial 
actors’ preferred solution to focus on ‘transparent disclosure 
standards.’24,38 More to the point, this attempt to redefine the 
policy problem provided the basis for a contradictory stew 
of corporate assertions aimed at encouraging the WHO to 
fundamentally rethink the tool. These included claims that 
the draft tool represented an ‘inoperable’39 case of overreach 
by virtue of an ‘extremely restrictive and sweeping definition 
of “non-aligned” actors,’24,39 was incomplete ‘in isolating only 
one kind of non-state actor,’38 and was unwieldy in so far as it 
would require ‘exceptional amounts of time’ to implement.40
Corporate Power and Nutrition Policy
The evolution of corporate lobbying from an intermittent, 
reactive enterprise into a systemic, proactive one is, arguably, 
the most important political transformation of the last 50 
years. The WHO’s decision-making tool on conflicts of 
interest. represents a necessary, but modest response to this 
transformation and a recognition that political participation 
plays out on an unequal landscape. But how effective is the 
draft tool likely to be in reconfiguring the politics of nutrition 
policy?
The strength of corporate opposition to the decision-
making tool provides a clear indication that food and beverage 
corporations are likely to contest national governments’ 
efforts to limit their political influence vigorously. The 
fact that adoption of the tool is discretionary is, therefore, 
a major weakness. Article 5.3 of the FCTC, for example, 
is legally binding on signatories to Convention, but still 
weakly implemented.12,41 Further, the fact that the tool notes 
that governments may consider following the decision-
making process ‘partially’ is premised on a fundamental 
misunderstanding of how companies seek to influence health 
policy. Corporate political activity is highly varied,42,43 plastic 
and constantly shifting.12 This allows corporations to adapt 
their efforts to influence policy in response to changing 
institutional norms and public and political sentiment and, 
effectively, capitalise on all available political opportunities to 
build consensus within governments, legislatures, and publics 
against policy change.12
Finally, even if the decision-making tool is followed in its 
entirety, aligning nutrition policy with public rather than 
corporate interests may continue to be challenging because of 
governments’ dependence on food and beverage corporations 
for employment and revenue generation.44-48 This not 
only underpins the effectiveness of corporations’ political 
activities, but, more importantly, provides the basis of their 
structural power, which shapes the range of choices open to 
governments without the need for corporations to pressurise 
them directly.45,49 Equally, corporations’ investment decisions 
– a major determinant of future employment and revenue 
generation – are sensitive to political signals concerning taxes 
and regulation.50 There is, of course, a risk of overplaying the 
significance of either governments’ economic dependence 
on food and beverage corporations’ investment decisions 
or the effects of regulation and taxation on these decisions. 
In practice, both will vary according to a range of factors. 
Either way, beverage corporations, in particular, have sought 
to play on government concerns over both by threatening to 
withdraw investments in response to proposed sugar taxes51,52 
and producing specious economic impact statements which 
exaggerate their economic impacts.13
In addition, corporations can reinforce their political 
power by institutionalising their structural advantage in 
policy-making. Importantly, transformations in institutional 
arrangements can reorganise political authority within 
nutrition policy even where they occur in areas not directly 
related to health.53,54 One way in which this reorganisation 
of political authority occurs is through the transfer of 
competencies to supranational institutions, such as the 
World Trade Organization. Thow and colleagues’ work on 
the potential role of the Codex Alimentarius Commission 
in imposing restrictions on national governments’ efforts 
to introduce front-of-pack nutrition labelling illustrates the 
point powerfully55. The Commission plays an important role 
in setting standards relevant to the interpretation of the World 
Trade Organization Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade. Discussions are currently underway under the auspices 
of the Codex regarding the potential development of guidance 
on front-of-pack nutrition labelling. Thow and colleagues’ 
analysis suggests that the governance structure of the Codex 
reinforces commercial actors’ structural advantages within 
these discussions and are progressively shaping how the issue 
is being deliberated.55
In summary, the draft tool is an encouraging development. 
However, efforts to manage corporate influence in nutrition 
policy need to be more ambitious if diet-related diseases 
are to be addressed effectively. A detailed framework, 
building on the draft tool, but outlining legally enforceable 
obligations for both national governments and food and 
beverage corporations is imperative. Wholesale reform of 
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trade and investment agreements and Better Regulation-style 
policy instruments, such as regulatory impact assessments, 
is also required. Beyond that, large transnational food and 
beverage organisations need to be broken up and new modes 
of ownership for major commercial entities within the food 
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